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1.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Integrated broadband networks (IBNs) will use fiberoptic technology to transmit large amounts of information, ranging from high-speed
data to entertainment programming, to business and residential users.
Currently, experimental fiberoptic links can carry the equivalent of
several thousand television channels. By comparison, state-of-the-art
cable television systems only offer about seventy channels. IBN s thus
have the potential of increasing the bandwidth available for business
and home applications by several orders of magnitude.
Deployment of IBN s is still far in the future. Observers differ as
to when IBNs may become economically viable. Predictions, however,
range from the next decade to the next millennium. Nevertheless,
policy makers already have begun analyzing potential regulatory
policies for IBN S.l Naturally, a key question in this analysis is defining
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how IBN s fit into the present regulatory regime. IBN s' interaction
with regulatory and legal norms will influence their development. This
interaction also may affect the legal and regulatory policies applicable
to traditional media by changing underlying policy assumptions.
This discussion will focus primarily on V.S. economic policies,
drawn from the Communications Act of 19342 and the V. S. antitrust
laws. 3 Thus, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the
District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. District Court) are
of major concern. 4 The focus on economic and antitrust policy is not
to diminish the importance of other legal or regulatory issues. Common
law principles are relevant in a variety of ways. For example, the
allocation of defamation liability between speaker and carrier might
have a substantial impact on a network's structure. 5 State regulatory
authorities also may play an increasingly significant role in IBN development, in terms of both telecommunications and industrial policy.
For example, some agencies have recently liberalized their restraints
on local telephone companies to promote investment in fiber, while
others have encouraged consortia of networks and users to develop
IBNs.
II.

REGULATORY STATUS OF IBN

Historically, different types of media have required different constitutional and regulatory treatment. As the Supreme Court has stated ad
infinitum, "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them . . . ."6
Over the years, American jurisprudence has created a spectrum of
possible constitutional and regulatory statuses for the media. This
spectrum runs from no regulation at all to close scrutiny. A newspaper
is subject to virtually no economic regulation and has complete editorial

2.
3.

47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-5201 (1988). The most significant exegesis on antitrust policy in the

context of the telecommunications industry has come from the divestiture of the American
Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), under the aegis of Judge Harold H. Greene in the
Modification of Final Judgment. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
4. The FCC regulates the rates and services offered by telecommunications firms. The
courts adjudicate disputes as to anti-competitive practices or structure.
5. For an excellent discussion of common law and statutory principles, see M. Meyerson,
3 U. FLA. J.L. & POL'y 49 (1990).
6. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1948) (The Court acknowledged that the medium of broadcasting
possesses a first amendment interest but, reflective of the different technologies employed in
this particular form of communication, different first amendment standards would apply.).
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responsibility,7 as well as liability, for its contents. A local exchange
telephone company (LEe), however, is subject to relatively strict
financial scrutiny even in a deregulated environment and has no control
over, or liability for, the contents of its transmissions. s
Over the last decade, the positions of various electronic media have
become increasingly unclear. Traditionally, most observers viewed
broadcast media as less protected than print, and cable as less than
broadcasting. 9 However, in several recent lower court cases, cable
operators have had some success in establishing themselves as "electronic publishers,"l0 and therefore immune from traditional economic
regulation. If this trend prevails, it could redefine the regulatory spectrum.
In terms of the regulatory spectrum, this discussion will focus on
the two polar extremes: freedom from regulation and traditional public
utility regulation. The first inquiry is whether IBN s should be subject
to regulation at all. Assuming that IBN s should be, the second question
is defining the proper type of regulation: that is, whether IBN s would
be best suited for conventional rate-of-return regulation as opposed
to informal price monitoring. 11 The increasingly large number of reg-

7. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). (The Supreme Court held that
a Florida statute granting political candidates the right to reply to editorials attacking their
personal character was an unconstitutional violation of the newspaper's first amendment rights.).
8. See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
9. E.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 951 (1963).
10. E.g., Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Involved a challenge to
rules intended to prevent the siphoning of programming from over the air "free" TV to cable.
The court emphasized that the scarcity rationale, which limits the first amendment rights of
broadcasters due to the limited amount of available space on the electromagnetic spectrum, was
not applicable to cable and therefore that cable operators were to be afforded a greater degree
of first amendment protection.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v.
FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Involved a challenge to the "must carry rules" which
required cable operators to carry the signal of any "local" broadcast station. Once again, the
court held that cable operators were entitled to a greater degree of first amendment protection
than broadcasters. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the scarcity rationale did
not apply to cable operators and that the use of public rights of way does not warrant intrusion
into a cable operator's first amendment rights.); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985)
(The court struck down as unconstitutional a Miami ordinance intended to regulate indecent and
obscene material on cable television. In rejecting an argument to apply the rationale of Pacifica,
the court noted that cable lacked the pervasiveness of broadcasting and was therefore entitled
to a greater degree of first amendment protection.). So far, the Supreme Court effectively has
not passed on the question of defining cable's first amendment rights, other than acknowledging
that the medium has some. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S.
488 (1986).
11. See infra note 68.
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ulatory permutations and combinations could subject new media to
"hybrid" regulation, combining aspects of the traditional print, broadcast, and public utility approaches. 12 The dichotomy between print and
public utility models is the most significant, since a decision to treat
IBN s as common carriers would answer a variety of other questions.
Although common carrier status requires offering adequate service to
all paying customers at reasonable rates, the extent of regulation may
vary.13 Thus, the narrow issue is identifying the most appropriate type
of common carrier regulation.
In contrast, classification of IBN s as hybrids instead of common
carriers would require creation of a totally new regime, an endeavor
which only after more than two decades is beginning to stabilize U. S.
cable television regulation. 14 This is not to suggest, however, that
common carrier regulation of IBN would avoid policy decisions, but
rather that the initial regulatory classification is very significant. Due
to IBN s' limited development, the definitional task is difficult. Despite
the commercial and academic interest in IBN s, they may not exist as
a viable economic entity until well into the next century.15 Nevertheless, some preliminary observations are necessary regarding IBN s'
regulatory classification and treatment.
The traditional reason for classifying an entity as a public utility,
or more specifically as a common carrier, is the entity's natural
monopoly characteristics. 16 A declining cost curve dictates not only
that a dominant firm can keep all others out, but also that a single
firm can offer consumers the lowest possible price. 17 The establishment
of a legal monopoly requires a variety of attendant consumer protections, such as the regulations involved with common carriers, because
of the monopoly's ability to charge supracompetitive prices and/or
provide inferior service.

12. In the context of telecommunications, of course, public utility treatment translates into
the subset of common carrier regulation. For example, the FCC has reclassified, as "private
radio," media previously subject to either broadcast or common carrier regulation. Hammond,
To Be or Not to Be: FCC Regulation of Video Subscription Technologies, 35 CATH. U. L. REV.
737 (1986).
13. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Meyerson, Cable Television's New Legal Universe: Early Judicial Response
to the Cable Act, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1987).
15. Johnson & Reed, Residential Broadband Services by Telephone Companies?, TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS & PUBLIC POLICY 41 (1990).
16. Natural monopoly status naturally would allow a firm to raise prices or decrease services,
because of the absence of any competition.
17. E.g., C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 35-65 (1984).
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Translating this phenomenon into legal terms is problematic. The
FCC and the courts have been unable to craft a satisfactory definition
of common carriage in more than fifty years of regulation. 18 However,
the basic concept is simple: a common carrier either holds itself out
by its business practices or is required by law to serve any qualified
customer.19 Yet, the Communications Act of 1934 failed to clearly
delineate the classification, by circularly defining a "common carrier"
as "a common carrier for hire in interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of
energy."20Furthermore, the FCC added little by defining a "communications common carrier" as "any person engaged in rendering communication service for hire to the public."21 Finally, the courts have
continued to complicate the issue. As the D.C. Circuit remarked in a
seminal case:
One may be a common carrier though the nature of the
service rendered is sufficiently specialized as to be of possible
use to only a fraction of the total population. . . . But a
carrier will not be a common carrier where its practice is to
make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether
and on what terms to deal. 22
Thus, common carriage appears to include any general offering of
communications service to any class of consumers, allowing the FCC
and the courts a large degree of discretion.
Consequently, although the common carrier rationale should apply
only to a natural monopoly, the FCC has imposed some common carrier
obligations upon firms that clearly were not natural monopolies. 23

18. See infra note 22.
19. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1989).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1982).
21. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1989).
22. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630,641 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(While addressing an FCC proposal to allocate spectrum space for use as mobile radio, the court
stated it was unnecessary that a common carrier be required to serve all indiscriminately; it
was enough that its practice was, in fact, to do so. Further, one must look to how the service
functions; if it looks like a common carrier, it will be regulated as one.), em. denied, 425 U.S.
992 (1976) [footnotes omitted]. Cf National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533
F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Challenge to FCC's attempt to preempt state common carrier regulation over the use of cable system leased access channels for two-way, point-to-point, nonvideo
communication. The court noted that one may be a common carrier by virtue of the actual
activities carried out. Moreover, the court continued, one can be a common carrier with regard
to some activities but not others.).
23. See, e.g., supra note 5 (the discussion of MMDS).
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Nevertheless, the statute seems to contemplate that a firm have some
natural monopoly characteristics before treating it as a common carrier.
IBN s may require common carrier status for two different reasons.
First, IBN s could evolve into natural monopolies. Second, and perhaps
more likely, IBNs may be owned by a natural monopoly, such as
LEGs. Under the second alternative, common carrier regulation would
be necessary to prevent a parent company from subsidizing an IBN
with revenue earned by virtue of its natural monopoly status, or,
conversely, from buying IBN services at artificially high prices. The
former situation would be equivalent to AT&T's pre-divestiture subsidy of its Bell Operating Gompanies (BOGs) from long distance revenues. 24 The latter compares to the BOGs' "goldplating" of their plants
through buying equipment at supracompetitive prices from AT&T's
unregulated manufacturing arm.25 Realistically, natural monopolyowned IBN s may ultimately require common carrier regulation, if
only for political reasons.
If not owned by a natural monopoly, such as an LEG or another
common carrier, an IBN might not require common carrier regulation.
IBN technology is far from settled. Whether IBN s will exhibit characteristics of a natural monopoly remains questionable. If IBNs do follow
the traditional pattern of telecommunication carriers, they would need
sophisticated central office switches and network control equipment. 26
The high cost of these items would probably create a declining cost
curve, a key characteristic of a natural monopoly.27
Whether IBNs will develop along these lines remains unclear. In
general, the current United States telecommunications industry relies
increasingly on decentralized facilities - leading to the christening of
"the geodesic network."28 Furthermore, some observers theorize that
an IBN's massive channel capacity will require relatively little centralization since the large amount of bandwidth available for network overhead could enable users to perform many of the switching and control

24.

See supra note 17, at 621-644.
Id.
26. The former for route trafficking between customers of the local exchange; the latter
for long-distance calls to the appropriate networks.
27. See supra note 17.
28. Peter W. Huber, The Geodesic Network: 1987 Report on Competition in the Telephone
Industry l.31-.36 (1987). Dr. Huber drafted his report as a consultant to the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, in preparation for its recommendations to the D.C. District Court
on its first review of the Modification of Final Judgment.
25.
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functions.29 Whether and to what extent this turns out to be the case,
of course, is sheer speculation. Nevertheless, this possibility might
give one pause before imposing strict common carrier regulation at
such an early phase in IBN development. This consideration might be
mooted, however, if present common carriers own IBN systems. Since
both long distance and local exchange carriers seem likely candidates
for IBN operations, common carrier regulation may be necessary, if
only to prevent past problems with cross-subsidization and goldplating.
In sum, IBN s are likely candidates for common carrier regulation,
because of the natural monopoly characteristics associated with them
or their parent companies. If IBNs are regulated as common carriers,
the next question is: to what extent should traditional common carrier
policies be altered in order to adapt to IBNs' potential characteristics?
III. REGULATION

OF

IBN PRACTICES

Regulation of a firm's practices depends largely upon an industry's
characteristics. The number of firms and amount of competition are
particularly important, since the greater the atomistic nature of an
industry, the lesser the likelihood of monopolistic or cartel-like behavior. This consideration again highlights the significance of IBN s
natural monopoly status.
If only one firm can operate in a field, more concern arises with
respect to potential exclusionary conduct. For example, allowing cable
operators, particularly vertically integrated ones, to operate IBNs
could create incentives for excluding third-party programming.
Moreover, if an IBN were considered a natural monopoly, allowing a
cable operator to control the IBN would compound concerns.
Alternatively, if IBNs compete within the same field, little reason
would exist to prevent one or more cable operators from controlling
an IBN. This approach would be somewhat similar to the FCC's regulation of cellular radio.30 For cellular radio, the FCC allocates half
of the available spectrum in each market to groups of "wireline" carriers, such as LECs, and the other half to "non-wireline" firms, such
as local broadcasters. 31

29. E.g., International Networks, Sept. 15, 1987, at 1.
30. Cellular radio includes both automotive and hand-held telephones.
31. Cellular Communications System, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981), recon. 89 F.C.C.2d 58,
recon. 90 F.C.C.2d 571 (1982). The wisdom of this approach is open to question. By giving the
existing LEC the right to apply for a cellular license with virtually no prospect of a competing
application, the FCC may have given wireline carriers a headstart in getting on the air as
indicated by the haste with which non-wireline carriers rushed to form consortia to file uncontested applications. Nevertheless, the basic concept may have some validity.
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Once again, IBN's very early stage of development impedes drawing any conclusions about potential industry structure. Nevertheless,
analyzing the range of possibilities may be useful in considering policy
alternatives.
A.

Provision of Services and Programming by IBN Operators

Traditional common carrier policy prevents carriers from providing
or controlling the intelligence transmitted by the carrier. 32 If IBNs
are treated as quasi-carriers, as once proposed for cable television
systems, traditional reasons for prohibiting them from providing content services may be questionable. Indeed, the FCC may experience
pressure to adopt a cable-type of "hybrid" regulation which allows
firms to provide their own services, yet provides access rights to third
parties. 33 Taking this stance at the very beginning of IBN's development, however, may not be advisable. Indeed, one of the turning
points in cable regulation may have been the rejection of a 1974 White
House proposal to regulate cable as a common carrier. 34
If IBN s exhibit monopoly characteristics, they should not be allowed either to offer their own services or to control third parties'
content. If an IBN provided programming, it would have an incentive
to interfere with third-party programmers' services. Indeed, the IBN's
position would be highly analogous to the BOCs' discrimination against
the other common carriers (OCCS)35 before the AT&T divestiture. 36
Until barred from operating cable television systems, the BOCs used
their control over conduits and poles to delay the entry of cable systems. 37

32. Recently, this time-honored principle has been sorely tried by litigation involving use
of LECs' "976" numbers to transmit sexually provocative recordings, commonly known as "dial-aporn." When faced with a congressional mandate to clean up dial-a-porn, the FCC first limited
it to late night hours, and then, under judicial pressure, required the users to have special
access codes, and ultimately found itself unable to apply the access code requirement to NYNEX
because of technological problems. Carlin Communications v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986).
More recently, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not ban "indecent," as opposed to
"obscene," material from LECs. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp. 1989).
34. Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications Reports, (1974) (commonly known as "the
Whitehead Report").
35. As the rather inelegant name implies, other common carriers are long-distance telephone
companies, e.g., MCI, Sprint, competing with AT&T. For a more thorough discussion of the
firms in this field, see Botein & Pearce, The Competitiveness of the u.s. Telecommunications
Industry: A New York Case Study, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 243 et. seq. (1988).
36. Id.
37. General Tel. of the S.W. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (The court held
that the FCC was acting justifiably and within its statutory authorization by promulgating rules
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Ownership of IBNs

Prohibiting IBNs from offering their own services and from controlling third party content would lessen the severity of ownership concerns. Strict separation of content and conduit should at least remove
an IBN's incentive to interfere with the third party, since the IBN
would have nothing to gain. Such a common carrier policy, however,
might not be a panacea. 38
Even though a firm may not benefit directly from excluding a
non-competitive company, it may act coercively to help a parent or
affiliated company. For example, some of the BOCs' most abusive
tactics towards OCCs and cable operators occurred under the tightly
regulated regime of the early 1970s. 39 Although the BOCs had little
or nothing to gain by preventing competition from the OCCs, AT&T
did. 40 Indeed, the D. C. District Court held that this anti-competitive
frame of mind had not dissipated as a result of divestiture. 41 Firms
also attempt to prevent entry where, although currently unable to
provide a competitive service, the firms anticipate being able to enter
the market at some later date. The BOCs' antipathy towards cable
operators, even after the FCC prohibited BOCs from owning cable
systems,42 indicates that long-term exclusion of competition may be
an incentive for IBN operators. Common carrier status alone will not
rule out abuse, if an IBN's parent company has the incentive to injure
a competitor. Regardless of justifications, common carrier regulation
per se does not obviate restrictions on IBN ownership. Thus, an attempt to identify types of media firms with an incentive to exclude
third parties, even under a common carrier regime, may be useful.

prohibiting telephone companies entering the cable business. The rules prohibited telephone
companies from providing cable service, either directly or through affilates, and constructing
cable facilities for independent cable operators unless the carrier first offered such operators
the option of placing their own cables on the carriers' poles. This decision stemmed 'from a
concern that common carriers were favoring their own subsidiaries in areas such as pole rentals
and access to conduit and poles.).
38. The fact that a market can support only a single firm may justify a firm's acquisition
of economic power. Official Airline Guides v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), eert. denied,
450 U.S. 917 (1981) held that the then acknowledged "Bible" of airline schedules was justified
in refusing to list commuter airlines flights, since a natural monopolist was entitled to make
discretionary decisions on a non-economic basis. To a very real extent the court may have been
concerned with first amendment notions of "journalistic discretion" and the like. E.g., Miami
Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
39. See supra note 38.
40. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C., 1987).
41. [d.
42. See supra note 38.
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In order to assess potentially dangerous cross-interests, an understanding of IBNs' product market, although speculative, is necessary.
Many observers believe that, at least initially, IBNs will provide video
programming as the ultimate extension of pay-per-view marketing. 43
Indeed, the only operational IBN-style facility focuses largely on random access programming and videoconferencing. 44 Moreover, in order
to justify the cost of building IBNs, LEGs may require this type of
additional revenue from home entertainment programming. 45 Finally,
with the advent of relatively high-speed integrated services digital
network (ISDN) links, present networks are probably capable of handling all but the largest firms' voice and data transmission needs.
Thus, IBN s' potential market for these services currently seems relatively small. Alternatively, if IBNs offered competitively priced voice
and data communication, the discussion below would require some
expansion.
With these assumptions in mind, identifying problems with potential ownership of IBN s by existing industries is possible. In the context
of IBN, as opposed to telephony, few incentives to interfere with
third-party services seem to exist. First, since an LEG is a common
carrier and thus subject to common carrier regulation, many anti-competitive practices will be prevented. More important, since LEGs have
virtually no experience in marketing video programming or similar
services, they will have no market to protect. This conclusion is evidenced by the BOGs' recent attempt to move into the videotex and
data base markets, which the D.G. District Gourt soundly rebuffed. 46
Whether IBN becomes a major provider of voice and data services,
however, remains to be seen. IflBNs primarily supply video programming, the LEGs would find themselves with little experience, and
perhaps little incentive, for providing content in addition to carriage.
Entering the video programming market would place LEGs in direct
competition with broadcasters, cable operators, and motion picture
studios - all of which have substantially more background than the
LEGs in marketing video programming. The LEGs, however, do have
substantial experience and expertise in the "nuts and bolts" aspect of

43. See Johnson & Reed, supra note 15, at 14 et. seq.
44. Gerin, The Biarritz Fiberoptic System, CABLE TV LAW & FINANCE, May 1986, at l.
45. A high-level BOC executive recently estimated that additional per-customer revenues
of $30.00 per month would be necessary to pay for the cost of building an IBN. Interestingly
enough, the average national cost of cable service is just a bit less than this amount. U.S.
General Accounting Office, Telecommunications: National Survey of Cable Television Rates
and Services 24, 44 (1989).
46. Western Electric, 673 F. Supp. at 600-04.
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making an IBN work. 47 Thus, an LEC's economies of scale might be
on the hardware rather than software side. Further, any effort by
the BOCs to offer content probably would repeat their unsuccessful
attempt to offer data base services to videotex providers. 48
Much the same reasoning would apply to AT&T and OCCs, which
also lack experience in producing or marketing video programming,
and have no immediate incentive to suppress third party IBN users.
As with the BOCs, history could repeat itself. For example, AT&T's
suppressed cable development. 49 Apparently, AT&T's long-term interest in entering the cable television business provided only a secondary motivation for exclusionary practices. 50 AT&T's primary incentive
was to coerce cable operators into leasing facilities from the BOCs,
rather than building their own plants. Thus, a local exchange or longdistance carrier might be interested in forcing programmers to migrate
from other facilities, such as cable systems, to its network.
Presumably, neither the LECs nor the long-distance carriers would
have this exclusionary incentive in the IBN context. If IBNs lack
natural monopoly characteristics, competing systems would be feasible. Thus, an IBN operator presumably would have no reason for
forcing programmers to use its network, because its operation would
not be the only one available. 51 On the positive side, long-distance
carriers have substantial experience with installation of networks in
general, and of flberoptics in particular. Therefore, like the LECs,
long-distance carriers may have economies of scale and scope. Consequently, operation of IBNs by either LECs or long-distance providers seems to pose little danger of excluding competitors and offers at
least possible economies.
The current video media, particularly cable television, present an
almost exactly opposite situation. Cable operators already provide
video programming, and presumably would compete head-to-head with
IBNs despite being saddled with low-bandwidth, obsolete, and expensive coaxial cable systems. Moreover, during the last few years many
cable operators have vertically integrated with program suppliers, as
shown by the cable industry's ability to prevent third parties from
offering "pay" and other satellite channels to earth station owners. 52

47. Nuts and bolts include installation, maintenance, and billing.
48. Western Electric, 673 F. Supp. at 587-88.
49. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
50. E.g., California Water & Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C. 2d 40 (1968).
51. This might not be the case during early IBN deployment, however, while cable systems
still pose effective competition.
52. E.g., Broadcasting, Nov. 30, 1987, at 116-117.
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The cable industry has every reason to view IBN s as potentially
destructive competition, which provides incentive to either kill or control IBN s. 53
If the cable industry dominated IBNs, it would have an incentive
to exclude third party suppliers. Indeed, cable operators waged a
largely successful battle to keep third parties off their systems,54 and
the rather vague "leased access" provisions of the 1984 Cable Act
seem to provide little relief. Moreover, the cable industry has little
experience with either switched networks or fiberoptics. United States
cable systems have "tree and branch" architecture, unlike the traditional "central office" approach in telephony. Additionally, cable
operators use fiber only to a very limited extent. 55
Overall, cable operators seem to have every reason to exclude
third parties from IBN s, while possessing very little relevant operational experience. This situation provides some irony, since it mirrors
the telephone industry's attempts to control cable television two decades ago. 56 During that time, the cable industry has grown strong
enough to utilize the same strategy on IBN s.
Exclusion of cable from IBN ownership, however, would not sound
the death knell for the cable industry. First, IBNs will develop slowly.
Second, considering that cable's capital costs would be much lower
than IBN's, both industries would probably operate side-by-side for
a long period of time. 57 Finally, the cable industry's increasing vertical
integration suggests that its ultimate role may be as a program provider, rather than as a network operator.
Similar considerations apply to broadcast television networks and
stations. As with cable operators, indirect sales of video programming
through advertising revenues give the networks an incentive to
exclude third parties. Also, though not as vertically integrated as
some cable operators, the networks have strong ties to program pro-

53. One indication of this is the cable industry's attempt to prevent LECs' from securing
federal legislation to allow entertainment video services. Broadcasting, Oct. 22, 1990, at 33.
54. In New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, 651 F. Supp. 802
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court adopted the novel holding on a motion to dismiss that Time's refusal
to offer pay services other than its own might violate the antitrust laws. The case ultimately
was settled.
55. Cable operators use fiber in their "backbone" trunk lines, rather than in their residential
distribution plants. To a certain extent, cable's recent, highly-publicized use of fiber may have
more political than technological value, as a means of arguing that cable can deliver the same
services as LECs.
56. See infra note 61.
57. In the last decade, a large part of the cable industry has incurred the cost of upgrading
to relatively high-capacity, that is fifty or more channels.
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ducers.58 Conversely, neither networks nor broadcasters have any experience in operating telecommunications facilities or in constructing
fiberoptic networks. Thus the networks seem to have potentially conflicting interests and no economies of scale or scope.
In the long run, television networks might be irrelevant, since
they may not exist by the time that IBN s arrive. Cable's recent
expansion leads many to predict that mass communications will move
from over-the-air transmission to cable by the end of the century. 59
Under this approach, the networks might change from distributors to
program producers. Even under this scenario, however, networks still
would have an incentive to exclude competing programs from IBN s. 60
In terms of cross-ownership policies, LECs and long-distance carriers seem to be the most appropriate entities to operate IBN s. Telephone carriers not only have comparatively few conflicts of interest
with third-party IBN users, but also enjoy some economies of scale.
Moreover, they probably are better positioned than other media to
generate the large amounts of capital necessary to build IBN s. While
cable operators and broadcast entities typically have small cash reserves, telephone companies have relatively large amounts. To illustrate, the entire cable industry currently has gross revenues roughly
equal to two of the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies.
This discussion of cross-ownership naturally has not considered
other possible rationales for ownership restrictions. At least three
other types of limitations seem possible: alien ownership, cross-ownership of local and long-distance networks, and ownership of more than
one IBN.
First, the Communications Act traditionally prohibits aliens from
owning more than twenty percent directly, or twenty-five percent
through a holding company, of any "broadcast or common carrier ...
license . . . . "61 The reasons behind the statute are less than clear.
Apparently, the restrictions stem from an early fear that hostile countries would use radio to transmit either propaganda or military information. 62 In comparison, cable television seems particularly unsuited

58. Report & Order, 23 F.C.C. 2d 382 (1970).
59. Broadcasting, Nov. 30, 1987, at 62.
60. Another consequence of such a development - far .beyond the scope of this paper is the effect on poor and rural people, who cannot afford IBN service; this problem is just
another side of the "universal service" isssue.
61. 47 U.S.C. § 31O(b) (1982).
62. Report & Order, 59 F.C.C. 2d 723 (1976). The FCC had discretion not to impose the
limitations, since the statute refers only to "broadcasters" or "common carriers," and cable is
neither.
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for either of these purposes. Thus, the FCC chose not to impose alien
ownership restrictions upon it. 63 The same logic should apply to IBN s,
since an IBN operator is unlikely to have as much control as a cable
operator over use of its system. Moreover, foreign capital could be
extremely helpful in implementing a capital-intensive enterprise such
as IBN s. This result would be similar to the significant foreign investment in the cable industry. Given some countries' intense interest in
entering the fiberoptics market, investment in a United States IBN
system could be an attractive means of forging commercial alliances
and reciprocal dealings.
Second, whether the same entity should be allowed to own both
local and long-distance IBN facilities should be considered. The reasoning behind the Modification of Final Judgment in the AT&T divestiture was to prevent the possibility of AT&T using an LEC to discriminate in favor of AT&T and against the OCCS.64 These policy considerations, however, would not apply in the context of IBNs. Traditionally,
telephony's natural monopoly characteristics are stronger for local than
long-distance networks, because of the high costs of central office
facilities. This phenomenon may not exist with IBNs, however, given
the large bandwidth coupled with the cost of long-distance fiberoptic
networks. If this situation resulted, ownership of local and long-distance transmission facilities would create no danger of exclusionary
tactics, since no potential competition on this level would exist. On
the other hand, allowing different firms to provide local and long-distance service might be advisable, solely to increase the number of
players in the IBN game. Arguably, such a system could lead to better
research and development. 65
Finally, limiting the number of local IBN s owned by a single entity
might be beneficial. Such restrictions would be analogous to the FCC's
mUltiple broadcast ownership rules, which restrict any entity to a total
of twelve AM, FM, and TV stations, or television coverage of twentyfive percent of the population. 66 Alternatively, IBN s probably will be
much more passive than broadcasting in terms of program content
control. Thus, the FCC's refusal to impose multiple ownership limita-

63. Id.
64. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131.
65. For example, total combined funding of R&D by AT&T and the BOCs increased after
divestiture. Noll, Bell Systems R&D Activities: The Impact of Divestiture, TELECOMMUNICA.
TIONS POLICY, June, 1987, at 161.
66. 47 C.F.R. § 73.636 (1987).
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tions on cable,67 which is probably far less passive than future IBNs,
militates against multiple ownership restrictions on IBNs. If IBNs
ultimately become the sole means for providing video programming
and are not common carriers, however, traditional first amendment
diversity principles would support common ownership limitations. 68 In
addition, diversification of ownership would benefit research, development, and innovation.
The advent of IBN s raises a number of difficult and unanswerable
questions. Which entities should be allowed to own IBNs? Should the
same entity own both local and long-distance facilities? Should a limit
on multiple ownership of IBNs be imposed? As with other IBN policy
issues, only tentative observations are possible at this early stage.
IV.

REGULATION OF RATES AND PRACTICES

If IBNs are treated as common carrier, regulation of their rates
and practices would be appropriate, if not inevitable. Regulators review rates not only to insure that the public receives the benefits of
a natural monopoly's declining cost curve, but also to prevent a
monopolist from manipulating its rate structure to exclude competition. 69 Similar concerns underlie scrutiny of a firm's practices in dealing
with both the public and third-party users. Despite these traditional
concerns, IBNs may avoid close regulation of either rates or practices.

A.

Rates

Unlike in the past, classification of an entity as a common carrier
does not necessarily subject it to rate-of-return regulation. In the
past, rate regulation effectively meant rate-based rate-of-return regulation. 70 Under the traditional approach, a regulatory agency first
determines a firm's expenses, then establishes the value of its plant

67. This policy may face reexamination in the future; as a result of recent mergers and
acquisitions, a handful of firms control more than half of the cable subscribers in the country.
In general, the FCC has shied away from multiple ownership restrictions for new video and
media, on the ground that they are still developmental. Report & Order, 52 P&F Rad. Reg.
2d 257 (1982).
68. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (Involved an anti-trust
challenge to Associated Press (AP) by-laws which prohibited AP members from selling news
to non-members and granted existing members the ability to block competitors from gaining
membership. The court stated "The fact that the publisher handles news while others handle
food does not ... afford the publisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in which he can with
impunity violate laws regulating business practices.").
69. Phillips, supra, note 17, at 51-63.
70. Id.
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(the rate base), and finally sets a rate of return sufficient to attract
future investments. 71 This approach has been less than popular with
regulators, firms, and the public. 72 All stages of the ratemaking process
involve often inevitable decisions. Consequently, many regulators
seem to resign themselves to simply making rough guesses; some
agencies routinely and Solomonicly give firms half of their requests.
In response to this disenchantment and deregulation, many agencies moved away from rate-of-return regulation. 73 The FCC requires
only "dominant" carriers, which essentially refers to AT&T, to justify
their rates. 74 Recently, the FCC totally scrapped rate regulation of
long-distance carriers except for core or basic services. In its place,
the FCC adopted a "price cap" approach, under which a carrier may
set any rate that falls under a predetermined maximum. 75 Thus, today
a relatively wide range of alternative regulatory schemes exists for
common carriers, ranging from the traditional rate-of-return regulation
to the recent price cap approach.
At this early stage in IBN development, what, if any, regulation
would be appropriate for the IBN industry is difficult to determine.
Due to economic and political reasons, however, to assume that IBNs
would necessarily be subject to some form of regulation is fair. First,
an IBN owned or operated by an established common carrier, creates
the possibility of cross-subsidy. From a practical stand point, regulation of the parent would necessarily include regulation of the subsidiary. Similarly, prevention of an IBN from discriminating against
competitors would require some regulatory scrutiny.
Although IBNs probably will be subject to some sort of regulation,
it is likely that the regulation will be relatively lenient. First, as a
new industry, minimal regulation would be required to provide IBN s
with the flexibility needed to respond to new and changing market
conditions. 76 Second, IBN's status as a newcomer indicates that rate-ofreturn regulation would be enigmatic. Since no real bench-marks exist,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a regulatory agency to make
informed decisions as to the reasonableness of either revenues or expenses. For example, an IBN conceivably would have higher promo-

71.

[d. at 229-377.

72.

See generally, THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: AN INTRODUCTION

TO A CURRENT ISSUE OF PUBLIC POLICY 30-56 (P.W. MacAvoyed. 1970).
73. L. JOHNSON, PRICE CAPS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION REFORM (1989).
74. MCI Communications v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
75. First Report & Order, 85 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1980); Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C. Red. 3195
(1988).
76. Initially, IBN s would have to generate substantial profits in order to attract capital.
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tional costs than a long-established LEC, thus necessitating a higher
rate of return. Assuming that IBN s resemble today's essentially unregulated cable industry, IBNs would arguably need an initial rate-of-return on the order of twenty-five percent, as opposed to twelve or
thirteen percent now common in the telephone industry.
Most regulatory agencies have jurisdiction over discrimination as
well as "unjust or unreasonable charges."77 At least initially, the primary role of IBN rate regulation would be the former rather than
the latter. This approach would protect IBNs' competitors, while preserving IBNs' flexibility. Moreover, extending any rate-of-return to
a new industry would be difficult since the method is sufficiently dated.
B.

Practices

In IBN regulation, guaranteeing access to IBNs by third-partyprogrammers is probably the most important consideration. This
guarantee would insure full use of IBN's bandwidth which compares
to dozens of cable television systems. As a result of this broad
bandwidth, a host of new program producers and packagers might
arise.
1.

Access Characteristics

The basic concept of access differs with respect to IBN s and telephony. In the latter, access involves the ability to interconnect with
an LEC's central office in order to transmit messages over the local
network, such as by a long distance carrier. 78 IBNs, however, vary
in two respects. First, IBN s' broad bandwidth will greatly diminish
the importance of switches. 79 Second, IBN suppliers may need to use
particular blocks of spectrum at specific times, such as video programming during prime viewing time. From a supplier's perspective, access
concerns with IBN s thus may resemble those in the cable rather than
in the telephone industry.
In contrast, IBN consumers probably will resemble telephone more
than cable subscribers. To the extent that IBN users are provided
with interactive applications, such as teleconferencing, the distinction
between IBN s' program suppliers and program consumers will be
more obscure than in the cable industry. From this perspective, IBN
access concerns most likely will parallel those in today's telephone
industry. Since access concerns represent a hybrid of the traditional,

77.
78.

E.g., 47 u.s.c. § 201(b) (1982).
E.g., AT&T, 552 F.2d at 13l.

79.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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yet differing, issues in the cable and telephone industries, an appropriate access scheme would likely be less stringent than traditional telephone tariffs, but more exacting than cable access requirements.
2.

Probable Access Schemes

Obviously, a central part of any access scheme for IBN s will require
that an IBN operator provide users with bandwidth not only on demand, but also at a non-discriminatory price. The reason for requiring
bandwidth on demand is based on the anticipated structure of an IBN.
Unlike contemporary cable operators, if IBNs achieve high capacity,
an IBN operator could provide as much capacity as required without
impairing its ability to sell programming. Consequently, only a minimal
scheme would be required to insure access, since third-party users
would receive any requested capacity.
Prevention of IBN operators from attempting to exclude competitors justifies the nondiscriminatory pricing requirement. If an
IBN's charges were too high, a regulatory agency could invoke its
power to police "unreasonable" or "unjust" rates. 80 However, judgments as to reasonableness would require considerable development
in the IBN industry.
Additionally, problems might exist if IBN operators charged different rates at different times of the day. To the extent that IBNs have
aspects of the mass media, some times of the day would be more
valuable than others. If an IBN operator had enough capacity to fulfill
all requests, however, little reason for imposing price differentials to
ration scarce resources would exist. Yet, positing virtually unlimited
channel capacity seems highly optimistic. After all, the FCC once
hailed cable television "an economy of abundance. "81 The reality, however, is a fierce battle by cable operators to keep third parties off
their channels. 82
If demand exceeds supply with IBN s, like every other video
medium, a more formal access scheme would be necessary.sa However,
experience with cable television access schemes provides two valuable
lessons. First, most commentators fail miserably in proposing workable
access schemes. 84 Second, though many cable operators willingly deal

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
NELL

E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 F.C.C. 2d 38, 39 (1970).
See supra note 14.
See supra note 67.
For a particularly disastrous attempt, see Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORL. REV. 419 (1972).
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with non-commercial access requests, commercial access users receive
short shrift, despite the absence of actual competition with a vertically
integrated cable operator's programming. B5 Thus, unless IBN develops
far more than an "economy of abundance," the prospects for creating
a workable IBN access scheme are not particularly bright.

v.

CONCLUSION

With IBN s or any other new technology, all regulatory bets are
off. The cable television experience shows the unpredictability of media
evolution. Nevertheless, a few general observations may be in order.
On a very simplistic level, common carrier status for IBN s appears
to resolve all the policy problems. 86 Taking IBN operators out of the
programming business removes their incentives to exclude or censor
competitors. But the common carrier cure not only may be a bit too
attractive, it also may ignore two critical concerns. First, even if IBN s
lack natural monopoly characteristics, if owned by a common carrier,
an IBN might be regulated as a monopoly. Second, common carrier
treatment of IBN s may not remove all incentives to exclude competitors, particularly if an IBN's parent company has present or future
interests in marketing content.
Regardless of whether or not IBN s should have carrier status and
despite a lack of natural monopoly characteristics, IBN s probably will
have sufficient market power to require some type of governmental
oversight. If IBN s develop virtually unlimited bandwidth, the degree
of governmental intrusion might be rather limited. Thus, IBN s might
become the electronic equivalent of the pre-Revolutionary War press,
which supported a number of competing newspapers. However, if
IBNs fail to fulfill their technological promise, IBNs may face the
same regulatory problems as the other electronic media. Thus, IBNs
would require the creation of yet another new regulatory scheme.

85. Indeed, the 1984 Cable Act virtually institutionalizes a cable operator's ability to exclude
its competitors by providing that a cable operator may set terms for third-party "leased access"
which "assure that such use will not adversely affect the operation, financial condition, or market
development of the cable system." 47 u.s.c. § 612(c)(l) (Supp. 1989).
86. Once again, common carrier status also was touted as the panacea for cable television.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Whether it would have fulfilled its promise in what
has become an intensely entrepreneurial industry is less than clear.

